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Abstract: A new wave of scholarship recognizes the importance of people’s understanding of
inequality that underlies their political convictions, civic values, and policy views. Much less is
known, however, about the sources of people’s different beliefs. I argue that scholarship is hampered
by a lack of consensus regarding the conceptualization and measurement of inequality beliefs,
in the absence of an organizing theory. To fill this gap, in this paper, I develop a framework for
studying the social basis of people’s explanations for inequality. I propose that people observe
unequal outcomes and must infer the invisible forces that brought these about, be they meritocratic
or structural in nature. In making inferences about the causes of inequality, people draw on lessons
from past experience and information about the world, both of which are biased and limited by their
background, social networks, and the environments they have been exposed to. Looking at inequality
beliefs through this lens allows for an investigation into the kinds of experiences and environments
that are particularly salient in shaping people’s inferential accounts of inequality. Specifically, I make a
case for investigating how socializing institutions such as schools and neighborhoods are “inferential
spaces” that shape how children and young adults come to learn about their unequal society and
their own place in it. I conclude by proposing testable hypotheses and implications for research.
Keywords: inequality; meritocracy; inference; social context; institutions
1. Introduction
As David Hume knew in 1777, causality cannot be observed; we see things happening, we find
patterns and we “make” causality. Drawing on advances in neuroimaging, scholars are closer than
ever to describing the neural process underlying causal inference. The evidence suggests people
have a “theory of mind” that allows them to reason about the unobserved causes of the things that
happen in their lives. Descriptions of this process vary, but the consensus is that people make causal
inferences based on available information and past experiences, and update their beliefs based on
new information [1–3]. A particularly pressing social phenomenon in need of causal explanation is
social inequality. Unequal outcomes confront us in the form of our daily struggles and achievements,
our friends and family’s plight, as well as the strangers we meet, be they awash in riches or in financial
need. Our experiences and observations require interpretation, and people in practice come up with
a variety of explanations, which social scientists refer to as inequality beliefs. Scholarship describes
wide-ranging differences in people’s beliefs about inequality but has not made much progress in
explaining why people understand inequality in one way or another [4–6]. The study of inequality
beliefs is in need of an organizing framework.
In this paper, I develop such a framework and discuss its implications for future research.
I propose that we conceive of beliefs about inequality as a special case of causal inference, where people
make sense of (observed) unequal outcomes by inferring the (unobserved) social forces that brought
these about. I suggest that this process is deeply socially bounded: in making inferences about the
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causes of inequality, people draw on lessons from past experiences and information about the world,
both of which are biased and limited by their background, social networks, and the environments they
have been exposed to. Looking at inequality beliefs through this lens allows for an investigation into
the kinds of experiences and environments that are particularly salient in shaping people’s inferential
accounts of inequality. In what follows, I review the extant social science literature on inequality
beliefs, before presenting a framework for systematically studying the social origins and development
of people’s inferences about inequality. Specifically, I make a case for investigating how socializing
institutions such as schools and neighborhoods are “inferential spaces” that shape how children and
young adults come to learn about their unequal society and their own place in it.
2. Beliefs about Inequality and Their Consequences
Inequality is like the manure of the elephant in the room; a constant reminder that something
just doesn’t smell right. But as with all our senses, people perceive differently: for some, the stench is
unbearable, while others manage to cope or even learn to appreciate the scent. An important source of
our different experiences of inequality, and our evaluation thereof, is how we have learned to make
sense of unequal outcomes. Some people hold inequalities to be the result of a fair, “meritocratic” race
that is decided by hard work and effort alone. Others believe the race is fixed: some people, because
of the color of their skin, gender, or their parents’ resources, among other things they cannot control,
have a much better shot at winning than do others. The former perspective emphasizes the actions of
individuals and the things they have control over. The latter view highlights the role of situational or
structural factors that are beyond an individual’s control. Following Kluegel and Smith, I refer to the
two, respectively, as individualist and structuralist beliefs about inequality [7].1
Scholars have long been interested in inequality beliefs for the way people understand inequality
is often the starting point of their politics and policy views as well as their feelings of solidarity
toward others—or lack thereof [8,9]. Moreover, research suggests that political attitudes and
policy preferences on topics such as the welfare state, redistributive taxation, and national health
coverage, reflect not just what people want their society to be; citizens’ responses to questions about
redistribution, and solidarity more generally, are based on their explanations of the causes of poverty
and wealth [8–12]. Similarly, attitudes toward policies redressing racial inequalities, research suggests,
are grounded in people’s explanations for racial inequality [13–15]. Even a person’s (political) response
to crime is shaped by what they think causes criminal behavior: people who hold structuralist beliefs
about crime, emphasizing the role of factors outside a person’s control that may lead him or her to
deviance, are much more likely than individualists to favor a non-punitive response to crime [16].
In short, these studies suggest that there are important consequences to whether one understands
societal positions as accomplished by individual efforts or failings or, alternatively, as the result of
discrimination, the limits or fortunes of birth, and other (structural) factors beyond a person’s control.
Another line of research describes how people’s understanding of what opportunities are or are
not available to them impacts their motivation, ambition, and efforts. This research tradition goes
back to Merton’s structural strain theory [17]. It posits that a person’s actions can be understood as an
interaction between the goals that person wants to pursue and the means they think are available or
unavailable to them, given structural constraints. In other words, a person’s efforts are shaped by the
balance of individual and structural factors that they think explains success and failure. Sociological
research since has powerfully described how, for instance, in education, students’ understanding of
success as structurally determined can give rise to a self-fulfilling prophecy of rejecting school and
all things academic [18–20]. Ogbu’s “burden of acting white” thesis similarly asserts that the racial
1 In what follows, my focus is on inequality beliefs conceived strictly as people’s understanding of the individual or structural
causes of (unequal) social outcomes. I acknowledge that these beliefs are related to people’s concerns about inequality,
their perceptions of the extent of inequality in society, and their ideas regarding what to do about it [6], but the topic of this
paper is limited to the former.
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achievement gap can be explained, in part, by black students opposing school because they think
the structural barriers to achievement are insurmountable [18]. While research since has refuted the
notion, these later studies at the same time show how minority students’ academic efforts reflect a
(sometimes unrealistic) meritocratic belief that hard work makes for societal success [21,22]. Taken
together, these findings underline the importance of understanding what drives people’s different
beliefs about inequality, which is the topic to which I now turn.
3. Psychological Explanations of Inequality Beliefs
Social psychological research from the 1960s and 1970s on has shown great interest in how people
explain unequal social outcomes. Research has produced two general accounts of what drives people’s
beliefs about inequality: self-interest and dominant ideology. In what follows, I briefly describe
each perspective.
Psychologists use the term “fundamental attribution error” to describe the tendency to attribute
social outcomes to hard work and effort for such serves our own interest, as when we attribute our
own success to individual factors, but our failures to structural factors [23,24]. Similarly, the ‘belief
in a just world’ theory suggests that people’s individualist beliefs about inequality stem from people
wanting to believe that they live in a world that is, at its core, just—as illustrated by idioms as “you got
what was coming to you,” “what goes around comes around,” and “you reap what you sow” [25].
Believing in a just world relieves us of the moral responsibility to care for other people and keeps us
from worrying about our future; it turns unequal outcomes into the (just) results of individuals’ talents
and efforts.
There are two empirical challenges to these theories. First, they fail to account for the observation
that many people do not think they live in a just world [26,27]. In fact, Kluegel and Smith report
that as much as 80 percent of their respondents said they live in an unequal society where social
outcomes are determined by structural forces beyond people’s control, such as discrimination and the
privileges of family wealth [7]. While recent surveys do indicate that people tend to underestimate
the extent of inequality in their society, there is little evidence to suggest that they believe theirs is a
just world [28,29]. Second, self-interest does not help explain how inequality beliefs oftentimes go
against a person’s interests, as when underprivileged groups explain their own position as resulting
from differences in effort and ambition [30–33] or when privileged social groups acknowledge their
own structural advantages [34].
Social psychology offers an alternative explanation in system justification theory. System
justification theory describes a socialization process, whereby people come to adopt a dominant
belief about inequality, whether or not it is in their interests to do so [35,36]. Referencing Karl Marx,
it is argued that, “because the ideas of the dominant tend to become the ideas of the dominated,
system-justifying stereotypes may be advanced by even those who stand to lose from it” [36]. In short,
growing up with the American dream makes one believe in it. Newman, for instance, vividly describes
how unemployed American workers, having internalized the American dream, blame themselves
for their dismissal and for their failure to find new work [32]. Sharone’s study of lay-offs in the
technology sector following the IT bubble burst in the early 2000s similarly describes how people
facing unemployment in San Francisco primarily blamed themselves for failing to find work despite
the well-documented structural causes of their predicament [37].
Cultural psychologists describe cultural differences between citizens of the world that can be
attributed to people’s socialization into different national ideologies—e.g., Japanese citizens hold very
different inequality beliefs from Americans, who in turn differ from Brazilians [38]. If this perspective
correctly describes a universal psychological tendency as well as a source of cultural variation, it still
faces a problem in the documented variation in inequality beliefs within societies. Studies in this
tradition for instance find that beliefs vary with people’s ethnicity, race, and income [39,40]. To their
credit, scholars acknowledge the problem [41], but they do not have a good answer for why people
have different beliefs. As Crittenden observed, “striking to a sociologist ( . . . ) is how little studied are
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the social conditions under which different attributional tendencies emerge” [42]. The next section
considers what these conditions might be.
4. Toward a Sociological Approach to Studying Inequality Beliefs
Starting with Kluegel and Smith, sociologists have studied patterns of variation in inequality
beliefs. Studies suggest that beliefs about inequality vary with age, income, education, religion,
and race, and that such differences are observable already with children 14 years of age [43–46].
Cross-country research similarly shows patterns of variation between citizens of different nations and
regions of the world [6,14,47,48]. Table 1 gives an overview of findings.
While these studies suggest a host of covariates of inequality beliefs, for almost every factor
suggested, there is another study that reports a non-significant relationship. Furthermore, there is little
agreement over how these factors are related to inequality beliefs and what the direction of causality
is. For instance, most studies suggest women are more likely to have a structural understanding
of inequality than men, but three studies report that women and girls have more individualist
beliefs [34,44,49]. Likewise, most research shows a positive relationship between education and
structuralist beliefs about inequality [45,50,51], but some studies suggest more highly educated people
are actually more likely to have an understanding of inequality that includes both individual and
structural factors [52], whereas other studies find no significant effect [49] or even indicate a negative
relationship [16,53].
The discrepancy in findings is attributable, in part, to differences in the conceptualization and
measurement of inequality beliefs. For instance, some studies investigate the socio-demographic
correlates of people’s explanations for unequal outcomes in general, while others focus on specific
explanations for poverty [45,54] or racial inequality [46,55]. This difference in focus is reflected also in
the different data sources used, ranging from theoretical samples [54] to probability samples of city
or state populations [45,51,56] and the General Social Survey (GSS), representative of the entire US
population [16,46,49,55,57].
Even within the set of studies based on the same GSS data, however, some scholars rely on
questions gauging people’s explanations of racial inequality2 whereas others center on people’s
responses to a question about the causes of income inequality.3 Another likely source of different
findings stems from authors’ measurement strategy. Important decisions include how to measure
individualist and structuralist responses, whether or not to include a mixed-category in-between,
and whether to investigate differences in beliefs by race [15], gender [46], or both [55]. Such choices
have substantial implications. For example, Kluegel, taking the former approach, finds that women
are more likely than men to hold a mixed-account of inequality, Reynolds and Xian find that women
are more likely than men to understand inequality in individualist terms, and Hunt highlights
differences between white women, who explain inequality in more structural terms, and black women,
who explain inequality as the result of individual factors.
2 “On the average blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are:
A. Mainly due to discrimination; B. Because most blacks have less in-born ability to learn; C. Because most blacks don’t have
the chance for education that it takes to rise out of poverty; D. Because most blacks just don’t have the motivation or will
power to pull themselves out of poverty.”
3 “How important is each of the following factors in determining whether people in the U.S. get ahead or fall behind
economically. After each please tell me if it is one of the most important factors determining whether or not Americans
get ahead or fall behind economically, very important, somewhat important, not too important or not important at all?
Hard work; Ambition; Having a good education; Having wealthy parent; Having well-educated parents; Knowing the right
people; Having political connections; A person’s race; A person’s religion; A person’s sex.”
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Table 1. Summary of findings for studies on the covariates of inequality beliefs.
Author(s) Sample
Race/Ethnicity
SES/Class Age Education
Gender
(F v M)
Politics
(D v R)
Region
(S v N)
Religion Urban
W A B L
Kluegel and Smith 1986 Americans (N = 2222) I S I I M M n.s. n.s.
Kluegel 1990 GSS 1977–1989 (N = 6697) Whites only S M S I
Wilson 1996 Baltimore residents (N = 248) M (ref) M S S S M
Hunt 1996
Telephone sample South California
(N = 2854) (OLS)
Whites only I n.s. S S
Blacks only S n.s. S n.s.
Bullock 1990 Rhode Island residents (N = 236) Whites only I S S
Barnes 2002 Poor Chicago residents (N = 2490) (ref) n.s. n.s. n.s. S I S n.s.
Bauman and Skitka 2006 Americans (N = 764) (ref) I M I I I M n.s.
Hunt 2007 GSS 1977–2004 (N = 16,397)
Whites only S I S S S I I
Blacks only M S M I S I n.s.
Taylor and Merino 2011 GSS 1996–2006 (N = 15,399)
Whites only I
Blacks only n.s.
Thompson and Bobo 2011 Americans (N = 1091) I S n.s. I I n.s. S I n.s.
Bobo et al. 2012 GSS 1977–2007 (N~22,000) I S I S
Croll 2013 Amer. Mosaic Proj. (N = 2081) S S I I S I n.s.
Merolla et al. 2011 LA County res. (N = 2166) M M M S S
Telles and Bailey 2013 Americas Barometer (N~1500) S I S S I
Grayman and Godfrey 2013 14-year old Americans (N = 2811) (ref) n.s. S n.s. n.s. I n.s. n.s.
Reynolds and Xian 2014 GSS 1987 + 2010 (N = 2209) I (ref) n.s. S n.s. I S I I
Newman et al. 2015
Pew surveys of representative
American sample (N = 8522)
Whites only n.s. n.s. I n.s. S I n.s.
Nonwhites only n.s. n.s. I n.s. S n.s. n.s.
Note: W = White, A = Asian, B = black, L = Latino/a; I = Individualist, M = Mixed, S = Structuralist.
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In sum, thirty years of scholarship since Kluegel and Smith’s Beliefs about Inequality has not
produced a comprehensive account that explains the observed patterns of co-variation. We need a
theoretical framework to integrate these studies and provide a roadmap for research. As a starting
point for such a framework, consider what neuroscientists call “theory of mind”:
Social life depends on developing an understanding of other people’s behavior: why they
do the things they do, and what they are likely to do next. Critically, though, the externally
observable actions are just observable consequences of an unobservable, internal causal
structure: the person’s goals and intentions, beliefs and desires, preferences and personality
traits. Thus, a cornerstone of the human capacity for social cognition is the ability to reason
about these invisible causes. [2]
Scholarship in neuroscience [2], developmental psychology [1], and cognitive science [3] has
fruitfully drawn on advances in brain imaging to study the ways in which people make inferences
about other people’s actions and intentions. The “theory of mind” they describe is an inferential
process whereby people draw on lessons from past experiences and update their beliefs based on new
information. Experience, I argue, is where sociology comes back in.
I propose that we think of inequality beliefs as problems of inference: people are, on a regular
basis, confronted by unequal social outcomes—be it success or failure, wealth or poverty—and must
make inferences about the unobserved social processes that underlie these outcomes. To theory of
mind, then, social science has one crucial addition to offer: the experiences people draw on in making
causal inferences are socially shaped. Thus, the key empirical question is as follows: what are the kinds
of social experiences that are especially salient in shaping our inferential accounts of inequality? In the
next section I suggest one way of systematically studying the link between experience and inference:
by focusing on the social institutions that provide the immediate social context to our experiences.
5. Institutions as Inferential Spaces: Linking Experience to Understanding
In learning about inequality, a young person must draw from experience. Meritocracy
is a powerful narrative, produced and reproduced by movie makers, authors, parents,
and politicians [27,58,59]. Developing a structural understanding of inequality requires that a person
has some evidence of non-meritocratic processes. A person is more likely to believe that money can
buy you an education, that family connections can get you a job, or that the “right” tone of skin can get
you out of a speeding ticket, if they, or someone close to them, experienced one or more of these things.
Race, sex, and religion are proxies for experiences with structural inequality, insomuch as people
live in societies where such identity categories are subject to discrimination. That is, having a gender,
sexuality, race or religion that faces discrimination, makes a person more likely to directly witness how
people’s lives are impacted by non-meritocratic processes (e.g., discrimination, favoritism). The same
is true of social class, especially in societies where status differences are salient in everyday interactions,
through speech, appearance, and other status markers [60,61].
A second source of experiences with inequality is the social environment in which people grow
up, which can be more or less racially and socioeconomically heterogeneous. I argue that encounters
with people from a different racial or socioeconomic background may introduce information indicative
of the structural sources of inequality in society, namely how race and family background help or
hinder social mobility [51,61–63]. Such encounters produce experiences which may lead emerging
adults to re-evaluate their worldview [64–66]. Conversely, an environment low in ethnoracial and
socioeconomic heterogeneity may keep young people from this kind of information and thus does not
provide counterevidence to the dominant meritocratic view of society [67–69].
Sampson and Bartusch go as far as to suggest we conceptualize beliefs as stemming from different
“cognitive landscapes” at the neighborhood and community level [70]. This concept helps identify the
fact that, certainly in America, being poor, black, and living in particular neighborhoods importantly
shapes a person’s social group and peers, interactions with authorities, and exposure to violence,
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among other formative experiences [71,72]. Whereas, arguably, this applies to all sorts of environments,
it may be especially true for socializing institutions such as neighborhoods and schools [71,73,74].
These institutions, more than others, constitute the context of adolescence, which research suggests
is when young adults are particularly impressionable. Moreover, beliefs formed in these years are
quite durable throughout a person’s life [75–77]. Inasmuch as they provide a context to a person’s
experiences and interactions with others, I argue, schools and neighborhoods are inferential spaces:
they shape the development of a person’s inequality beliefs by exposing that person to a certain type
and range of information, but not to their counterfactuals.
Specifically, I conceive of an inferential process whereby people draw from direct experiences and
information available to them to develop an understanding of social inequality. That is, the way people
learn from their homogenous or heterogeneous environment is not necessarily based on what they are
explicitly taught or told, but instead entails inferential work, whereby a person constructs a model
of the world based on the information available to them [78,79]. In other words, inferential work is
a distinctly inductive process, as contrasted to the deductive manner through which a person may
arrive at an individualist explanation for unequal outcomes based on a general belief in meritocracy.
This process shares features of Zaller’s “Receive, Accept, Sample” (RAS) model on how people
form political preferences based on information from mass media [80]: political opinions are a product
of people’s varying exposure and attention to political information in the media, especially the ideas
that appear immediately salient to them. The extent to which people accept new information however
is based on how knowledgeable they are on the topic, i.e., on their exposure to previous information.
A similar self-reinforcing process is at play in the formation of people’s inequality beliefs. Where the
inferential process differs from Zaller’s model is in the primacy of experiential knowledge: despite all
the news on inequality, for many people, the world as presented in the media, or depicted by politicians,
may not correspond to their lived experience. A person who has come to understand unequal outcomes
in individualist terms may not accept at face-value an account of structural (dis)advantage. Similarly,
a person who through their experiences has come to see inequality in structural terms will likely have
a critical response to meritocratic claims. The implication is that inequality beliefs tend to have a
self-reinforcing quality that is hard to break until some critical mass of new information and experience
has been reached.
The hypothesized role of experiences is akin to contact theory which states that exposure to ethnic,
racial, or socioeconomic heterogeneity can lead to a reduction in prejudice and improve intergroup
tolerance and sympathy [81]. However, I argue that these are best considered as possible outcomes
of a cognitive process of (improved) understanding of the other group’s plight. That is, experiences
with heterogeneity may impact, through an inferential process, a person’s beliefs about inequality
and, by implication, the deservingness of people in power and in need. Whether these (updated)
beliefs translate into affects, empathy, politics, and intergroup relations, is another matter. Different
settings—interactional, local, or national—may give rise to forces that either promote or suppress
change. By more systematically studying the links between experience, beliefs, and attitudes we
should get better answers to questions like, when do experiences and interactions with heterogeneity
translate into belief change, and under what conditions do such changes impact a person’s attitudes
about people from a different class or racial background?
The following formally presents my theoretical framework and expectations in terms of an
inferential model of belief formation: people exposed to heterogeneous environments, having learned
about the role of structural factors in shaping life outcomes, have a causal model of inequality
that features more structural factors as compared to people who have been exposed mainly to
homogeneous institutions.
1. To explain specific life outcomes, and inequality more broadly, people implicitly construct a
causal model of the social world that includes a vector of variables, X, for all factors they think are
relevant to explaining the observed outcome, Y. We can express structural factors as Xstr and individual
factors as Xind, such that
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Y = Xstr + Xind (1)
2. The variables that enter a person’s model of the social world are based in large part on
how salient individual and structural factors, Eind and Estr, are in a person’s own experiences and
observations, as well as on information, Iind and Istr, people collect from other sources, conditional on
whether this information seems plausible in light of their experiences and observations, such that
Y = Xstr (Estr + Istr|Estr) + Xind (Eind + Iind|Eind) (2)
3. For a person to experience the salience of an individual or structural factor, he or she must
be able to observe variation both in the factor and in the relevant outcome—e.g., variation in effort
and corresponding reward, variation in race/ethnicity and corresponding discrimination. A person’s
assessment of the salience of individual and structural factors, Eind and Estr, thus varies with the extent
to which they have had an opportunity to observe or experience variation in these factors.
Opportunities to experience or observe variation in individual and structural factors are
conditioned by the composition of the institutions in which people grow up and learn about the
social world: the more socioeconomically and/or ethnoracially heterogeneous an institution, H,
the more opportunities a person has for observing and experiencing the salience of race and family
resources (structural factors) and conversely the more homogenous an institution the more salient are
individual factors, relative to structural factors, such that
H↑ → Estr↑ Eind↓ and H↓ → Eind↑ Estr↓ (3)
4. In sum, the more time a person has spent in heterogeneous institutions, the more important
structural factors feature in their model of the social world, and the less prominently do individual
factors feature.
Y = Xstr (H) + Xind (-H) (4)
Homogeneity reduces a person’s exposure to explanatory variables other than a person’s attitudes
and actions, that may importantly affect social outcomes; e.g., the kind of family resources one can or
cannot draw on, connections that one may have or lack, the way one is treated by others based on the
color of their skin. This leads to a tendency to overestimate the influence of an individual’s actions.
In other words, homogeneous settings foster the illusion of a direct correspondence between hard
work and success (or laziness and failure) by effectively eliminating from observation, and excising
from the setting, all other factors of difference (things people have no control over).
What belies this relationship can alternatively be stated in terms of differences in counterfactual
information. That is, the homogeneity or heterogeneity of an institutions shapes the available
counterfactual information that a person can draw on in making causal inferences. Among other
things, it may shape a person’s view of the “ordinary person” counterfactual, or benchmark, if you will,
to compare with the person they are evaluating; it may shape their understanding of the counterfactual
outcome, i.e., what would have happened if it were not for the person’s action(s); and it may shape what
kind of information a person thinks of as relevant to take into account when making these inferences.
Zooming out, Figure 1 graphically illustrates the hypothesized links between institutions (A),
causal inference (B), and its implications for people’s political attitudes, citizenship behavior, and moral
judgements (C)—as documented by the literature reviewed in Section 2. In sum, I describe an inferential
process whereby people learn about the world they live in by drawing conclusions supported by their
observations and experiences. Specifically, I propose that one of the ways (young) people make sense
of their world is by constructing a causal model of unequal outcomes as explained by the variables
they have understood to be most important (B). The implication is that people’s causal inferences
about success and failure—and, consequently, of inequality—are shaped by the type of institutional
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environment they have been durably exposed to (A). I expect people who are durably exposed to more
heterogeneity to develop a more structuralist understanding of inequality over time, whereas I expect
people in more homogenous settings to develop more individualist beliefs about inequality. What kind
of beliefs people develop, in turn, impacts their political attitudes and policy preferences as well as
their feelings of solidarity more generally (C).
6. Implications for Research
The inferential model of belief formation spells out a number of empirical predictions.
It acknowledges that people are psychologically biased as well as culturally primed toward explaining
unequal outcomes in individualist, meritocratic, terms. However, not everyone is similarly biased.
The extent to which people are, is socially shaped by people’s experience with and exposure to
structural forces driving unequal outcomes.
Individual characteristics, like a person’s race or gender, are imperfect proxies for such experiences.
Reflective of their greater exposure to discrimination, women generally are less likely than men
to understand outcomes in purely meritocratic terms [14,45,51,55], and so are African Americans,
as compared with white Americans [7,15,16,44,52]. These associations however depend on context,
which may explain why some surveys report contradictory patterns. To see how, researchers should
situate individuals in their social context. In line with predictions from the inferential model, studies
suggest that women are relatively more likely to explain outcomes meritocratically, and less likely
to recognize structural barriers, when they are durably exposed to homogenous, gender-segregated,
environments—as is true for women in engineering or male-dominated corporate settings [82–84].
The same holds for men in such settings, who in the absence of exposure to diversity in status and
gender, infer meritocratic explanations for the causes of sex differences in job title and income [85–87].
Studies similarly describe how the link between race, ethnicity and socioeconomic status, on the
one side, and people’s beliefs about inequality, on the other, is mediated by people’s exposure
to heterogeneity. As Edmiston concludes from his interviews with affluent and poor Brits and
New Zealanders,
Affluent participants who had sustained interaction with, or experience of, structural
constraints were much more likely to recognize the factors that might mitigate an individual’s
responsibility for their situation or actions. Knowledge accumulation, therefore, appears to
mediate awareness and appreciation of the relationship between structure and agency. [67]
One source of such experiences is the neighborhood a person lives in: people living in
socioeconomically homogeneous neighborhoods tend to hold meritocratic beliefs, whereas people in
economically heterogeneous areas are more likely to explain outcomes in structural terms [56,88,89].
Underlying this association is mechanistic evidence that people make inferences about their unequal
society based on their local experiences [69,78].
Other studies point to the role of schools in exposing students to homogenous or heterogeneous
settings, such that “youth of color attending segregated schools experience structural discrimination
on a daily basis, but they lack the opportunity to make between-race comparisons on a daily basis.
Students who cross boundaries, in other words, are more likely to see discrimination than those
who do not make these journeys” [74]. Mijs describes how secondary school students in more
(socioeconomically) homogeneous school environments are more likely to explain poor school results in
individualist terms and internalize failure, compared to students in more heterogeneous environments,
who see school outcomes as the result of a range of factors both within and beyond their control [90].
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Crucial evidence that inequality beliefs are open to change, comes from longitudinal studies of
college students. Sidanius et al., describe a “liberalizing effect” of college: over the college years,
students tend to develop more liberal political attitudes and a more empathetic understanding of
minorities’ plight [91]. This liberalizing tendency is especially strong for students who experienced
heterogeneity through their social interactions on campus or by having a roommate from a different
ethnic or racial background. Conversely, Mendelberg et al. describe how students at socioeconomically
homogenous colleges develop a more conservative outlook and corresponding set of beliefs [92].
Mijs describes how the same is true with respect to students’ beliefs about meritocracy and the causes
of racial inequality: students who experience ethnic, racial and socioeconomic heterogeneity through
their roommate, in their social interactions, or on campus more generally, develop a more structural
understanding of inequality, whereas students without such experiences grow more convinced that
theirs is a meritocratic society [93]. Khan [94] and Gaztambide-Fernández [95] similarly describe
how most students at the homogenous and exclusive “elite institutions” they studied developed a
meritocratic understanding of social inequality in their society and came to think of themselves as
deserving of a place at the top.
In sum, the inferential model of belief formation seems to stand its empirical ground. Future work
will show its uses and its limits. At minimum, the framework here presented should provide conceptual
clarity and offer a common ground for the wide-ranging research interest in inequality beliefs across
social science disciplines. I conclude by offering five suggestions for how to proceed, empirically.
First, inequality beliefs are best considered cognitive concepts, distinct from norms and
preferences [6,7]. That is, a person may have a belief about how to world is and works (i.e., how much
inequality there is and what processes generate it) that is different from, even conflicting with, how they
would like the world to be and how they would like to get there (i.e., through what interventions,
politics and policies).
Second, inequality beliefs are best assessed as detailed explanations of life outcomes, adding
up to a more or less coherent perspective. Patterns of explanations may differ by topic or domain.
For instance, people may hold beliefs that can be characterized as individualist when explaining
life outcomes in education or work, but take a more structuralist form when thinking about the
determinants of crime. It is an empirical question whether these domain differences are the product of
people’s experiences with regard to these outcomes, or whether they reflect different notions of how
cause-and-effect and responsibility apply to these domains [5].
Third, inequality beliefs are best conceptualized as multidimensional: whereas there is a negative
relationship between structural and individualist beliefs, there is no evidence to suggest that the
two are in a zero sum relationship [8,15]. Just as any single life outcome is best explained by a
multitude of factors, we can think of a person’s inequality beliefs as being marked by a combination—or
repertoire—of individual and structural factors that can be applied—or activated—to explain various
life outcomes [96].
Operationalizing a multidimensional concept requires some kind of “flattening” for the purposes
of measurement. Table 2 illustrates one way to do so. Dichotomizing beliefs about hard work
(individualist beliefs) and beliefs about the role of structural forces allows for an operationalization
of four multinomial categories that describe a person’s inequality beliefs. We can label these as
“predominantly individualist”/“predominantly structuralist”/“mixed beliefs” and a final category
which denotes the belief that neither hard work nor structural forces explain societal success—one way
to think of this position is as emphasizing the importance of chance. The numbers here provided for
illustrative purposes could be an empirical record of a single person’s beliefs or that of a large group of
people, such as the typical beliefs held by citizens of one country; e.g., while approximately 75 percent
of people (55 + 20) may think that societal success is the product of hard work, a large share of these
people (20/75) could also think structural factors are part of the explanation, which is how McCall
describes the typical American’s view of inequality [27].
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Table 2. Two-dimensional conceptualization of a person’s inequality beliefs.
Societal Success
Is the Product of Hard Work
Disagree Agree
Is the product of
structural forces
Disagree 5% 55%
Agree 20% 20%
Fourth, inequality beliefs are best studied longitudinally, as a person’s evolving understanding
of society and their own place in it. As is, repeated representative surveys like the GSS and the
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) are the best of a small set of sources for studying
changing beliefs about inequality, but only at the level of society. To study whether and how
individuals change their understanding of inequality, as a factor of their changing environment
or of particular experiences and events in their life, we need more detailed panel data. An especially
important question to consider is if and how beliefs solidify during the life course. Research in
developmental (neuro)psychology suggests that children make sense of their world based on their
immediate environment, starting from around the age of eight and we know that different inequality
beliefs are observable at least by age 14 [44]. Further, research on lifespan political socialization
suggests that young adults are particularly impressionable in their college years, and that beliefs
formed in those years are quite durable over a person’s life course [75–77]. It remains an open
question however when the impact of experiences reaches its peak and if and when experiences with
homogeneity/heterogeneity reach a saturation point, as implied by the theoretical model.
Fifth, and related to the previous suggestion, inequality beliefs are best collected contextually.
Whether through qualitative methods or by means of a survey questionnaire, it is crucial that scholars
collect as much relevant contextual data to situate people’s understanding of inequality in their current
and past institutional environment (e.g., in the neighborhood, in school and at the workplace). A survey
approach would especially benefit from the linkage of geolocation data and administrative records
with individuals’ self-reported descriptions of their institutions. Regional geolocation data has proven
useful, for instance, to describe the link between growing up in an economic recession and a person’s
views about the causes of economic fortunes [97]. Combining objective and subjective measures of
institutional environment would allow for a more robust measurement of people’s perceived and
experienced context, and would enable us to study how such perceptions and experiences may shape
belief formation. An example of a more qualitative approach is to define two or more groups of youth
growing up in settings varying in heterogeneity, and ask respondents to keep a diary to record their
thoughts on a set of events or life outcomes common to all groups. Whereas a survey would bring
out most clearly the likely patterns of variation, comparing diary entries may yield more nuance and
insight into how people make sense of key events in their lives, and their causes.
7. Conclusions
From Julius Caesar’s self-described decisive victory over the Gauls to the superior ingenuity
of David in defeating Goliath, Western culture is rife with stories of individual accomplishment.
We celebrate the success of leaders in business, science, and sports, and when we do, we tend to
attribute the outcome of events to the achievements of (extraordinary) individuals. An alternative
worldview is one that acknowledges the role of structural forces in shaping our lives: perhaps some of
us did not have the same opportunities as others. Indeed, social science research has well-documented
the (structural) advantages that benefit people with money, resources, and connections in getting ahead
in life. Those same processes constitute barriers to people with fewer economic, cultural, and social
means, and similar disadvantages face people of color, women, and other minorities.
In this paper I have argued that our different experiences mean that our appreciation of these
processes varies. Consequently, we see inequality through the lens of our unique biography, explaining
unequal outcomes in terms that resonate with our particular set of experiences. Whereas any person’s
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life is singular, we find common ground with others who grew up in similar circumstances; with whom
we share a common outlook on life. What belies our outlook on life, I suggest, is shaped to an important
degree by the institutions that provide the immediate context to our social life, especially in childhood
and adolescence. To the extent that they do, institutions like neighborhoods and schools are “inferential
spaces” that shape how we learn about the world by providing access to certain experiences and
information, but not their counterfactuals. Socioeconomically and racially heterogeneous institutions
teach us about the ways that race and class matter; lessons that are not as easily learned when growing
up in homogenous institutions, with mostly people of the same income and racial group.
Situating people’s inequality beliefs in their socially-bounded experiences helps make sense of the
contradictory findings reported in studies that attempt to explain people’s inequality beliefs in terms
of individual characteristics, such as gender, race, education, or socio-economic status. Specifically,
looking at inequality through the lens of inferential spaces explains why people living in homogeneous
neighborhoods hold more meritocratic beliefs about inequality, whereas people in heterogeneous areas
understand unequal outcomes in structural terms [56,88,89]. Men and women explain sex differences
in status and income in meritocratic terms, in the absence of exposure to diversity in status and
gender [82–87]. Students who experience heterogeneity develop a more structural understanding
of school outcomes [90] and unequal outcomes more generally [93], whereas students without such
experiences became more convinced that theirs is a meritocratic society [93–95]. Future research will
show the uses and limits of the inferential model of belief formation here presented.
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